Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House (California Series on Social Choice and Political Economy) |
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Author:
Gary W. Cox,
Mathew D. McCubbins
By University of California Press
Average Customer Rating:  
List Price: $55.00
Our Price: $9.90
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Product Description
This book provides an incisive new look at the inner workings of the House of Representatives in the post-World War II era. Reevaluating the role of parties and committees, Gary Cox and Mathew McCubbins view parties in the House--especially majority parties--as a species of "legislative cartel." These cartels usurp the power, theoretically resident in the House, to make rules governing the structure and process of legislation. Possession of this rule-making power leads to two main consequences. First, the legislative process in general, and the committee system in particular, is stacked in favor of majority party interests. Second, because the majority party has all the structural advantages, the key players in most legislative deals are members of that party and the majority party's central agreements are facilitated by cartel rules and policed by the cartel's leadership.
Debunking prevailing arguments about the weakening of congressional parties, Cox and McCubbins powerfully illuminate the ways in which parties exercise considerable discretion in organizing the House to carry out its work.
This work will have an important impact on the study of American politics, and will greatly interest students of Congress, the presidency, and the political party system.
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On its way to being a classic, 2001-03-22
A significant chunk of the recent work on political parties in Congress begins with this book. Its going to be one of those classics that every political scientist eventually cites, and so its one that every political scientist shown probably own. The book review is a pretty good summary of the argument. The theory and the empirical studies are a bit loose, and the conclusions are overdrawn in places, but the idea is (was) sufficiently novel that it represents a serious innovation in contemporary thinking about political parties and congressional organization. Whatever you might think about the book's argument that parties are a legislative cartel, this theory is the foundation for what will surely become an enormous literature in political science.
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Binding: Hardcover
Dewey Decimal Number: 328.730769
EAN: 9780520072190
ISBN: 0520072197
Label: University of California Press
Manufacturer: University of California Press
Number Of Items: 1
Number Of Pages: 289
Publication Date: 1993-04-05
Publisher: University of California Press
Studio: University of California Press |
